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This is an experimental study aimed to analyze which incentive —punishment or reward—is better 
at promoting cooperation under the possibility to free-ride in the framework of the financing of 
public goods. The main tool that has been used to conduct this study is the Public Goods Game 
experiment with two of its variations. In the first variation, punishment opportunities were allowed 
and, in the second one, rewarding opportunities were present. This methodology has allowed the 
comparison of both incentives against each other and against the standard PGG, revealing their 
weaknesses and advantages. In line with former research, results have verified that individuals, on 
average, provide levels of contributions halfway the free-riding and the full provision scenario. 
Also, while both incentives have been able to prevent the decline of cooperation observed in the 
standard game, punishment has promoted the highest mean contributions and reward the highest 
mean payoffs. For such reason, it has been far from easy to determine which one is better overall. 
In conclusion, this study provides evidence that both punishment and reward can succeed at 
sustaining cooperation in the PGG setting, although reward can be the optimal force at delivering 
higher payoffs.  
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Every single one of us, voluntarily or not, have had to participate on group projects. We pleasingly 
accept to take part in them because by doing so we will theoretically be able to achieve a common 
and desired goal that would be inconceivable to procure if working separately. However, even if 
all members of the group target the same objective, in this kind of enterprises most often 
participants are differently committed to that goal and they don’t put the same effort to strive for 
it. At this point, moral values such as equality and reciprocity enter the scene, as we expect that all 
members of the group put more or less the same effort. Unfortunately, this is hardly ever the case 
and we often encounter individuals that will take advantage from the fruits of our work, while 
contributing themselves as little as possible. Thus, the question is: What could we do to incentivize 
cooperation or disincentive parasitism in this kind of scenarios? 
To answer such question I am going to do an experimental study that, in particular, will be focused 
on a what could be described as a large scale “group project”: the financing of public goods. A 
public good is both a non-rivalrous and a non-excludable good. On the one hand, this means that 
one individual’s consumption of the good does not affect another’s opportunity to consume that 
good. On the other, non-excludability implies that individuals cannot deny each other the 
opportunity to consume the good. One of the characteristics of this kind of goods, is that the 
optimal provision cannot be attained by the private-sector or, in other words, the market 
mechanism does not provide an efficient outcome. This implies that welfare of individuals could 
be improved if a larger quantity of the good is provided. If that’s the case, we say that there is 
under provision of that good. To avoid that individuals underinvest —that is, free-ride— the public 
good can be supplied by the government in order to reach the social optimal equilibrium.  
However, even if that is the case, individuals can free ride through mechanisms such as tax evasion 
or tax avoidance. Furthermore, the maintenance of this kind of goods often relies on voluntary and 
informal interactions, meaning that it still depends on the willingness of individuals to cooperate 
(Merrett, 2012). Also, even if public goods are supplied by the public sector, there is a growing 
evidence that in recent years welfare states will struggle even more to supply the efficient level. 
For instance, McMorrow & Roeger (1999) had already pointed out the hazard of population ageing 
as to its implications to public finances overall and, in particular, the pension and health care 
budgets. Today we are certain that population pyramids are shrinking over time, increasing the 
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ratio of retired population relative to the labor force and forcing governments to rise more money 
from fewer individuals to keep financing welfare states. Furthermore, the size of the shadow 
economy in Southern European countries such as Spain is above 20% of the official GDP 
(Schneider & Boockmann, 2018) and, for now, it seems that this situation will not be reversed. 
All in all, it seems reasonable enough to accept that under provision is currently a threat for many 
economies. In particular, for many states that have had to deal with several economic crises almost 
in a row and are struggling to finance themselves. Fortunately, there are multiple steps that 
policymakers could take to overcome these issues, but many times the promotion of cooperation 
is not considered as a decisive point. For my part, I think that it is perhaps the most straight-forward 
step that could be taken to tackle under provision; while I acknowledge that free-riding is possibly 
not the main cause, I find that it is still relevant and deserves a deeper analysis. For such reason, I 
will study two mechanisms that can be implemented to curb free-riding and incentivize 
cooperation —punishment and reward. The first one, is the most widely used and the second one, 
a reward scheme, is more difficult to find as it is usually considered less efficient.  
My thesis statement is as follows: “Reward schemes can be as effective as punishment at 
sustaining long term cooperation. Furthermore, punishment schemes will harm social welfare at 
a larger extent than reward schemes, as they entail a cost for both the punishing individual and 
the recipient”. Consequently, in this study I will be examining how the provision of public goods 
can be sustained under the possibility to free-ride and hence how to promote cooperation and curb 
free-riding. In particular, I will try to understand how individuals behave when mechanisms to 
promote contributions are implemented. But before going  any further, I will review the most 
relevant literature that concerns our topic. This review will hopefully be enlightening and will 






2. Literature review 
In 1988, James Andreoni already analyzed the free riding hypothesis in public good experiments. 
Regarding the Public Goods Game —from now on PGG—, he observed that, while it is true that 
the extent of free riding differs across experiments, three observations were consistently replicated. 
First, there was no evidence of free riding in single shot games and, in addition, he pointed out that 
subjects generally provide the public goods at levels halfway between the Pareto efficient level 
and the free riding level. Second, Andreoni observed that when the game is repeated, provision 
decays toward the free riding level, regardless if individuals know the length of the game or not. 
Third, he suggested that exact free riding is seldom realized. All in all, he argued that repetition 
seems to be necessary for subjects to approach the free riding behavior. 
As we have seen with Andreoni, PGG experiments have showed that individuals deviate from the 
theoretical  PGG’s equilibrium —i.e. they choose to cooperate— contributing on average half of 
their endowments. Also, while it is true that generally cooperation decays with repetition, it is still 
persistent. The reasons behind this have become a crucial issue to understand and, traditionally 
there have been two paramount hypotheses: one pointing out that cooperation is due to non-
standard behavior —moral values, bounded rationality, social norms— and the other focusing on 
errors and confusion. Even if it is likely that both hypothesis play a role, it has been extremely 
difficult to determine whether cooperation comes out of kindness or out of confusion.  
Still with Andreoni, he attemped in 1995 to separate the aforementioned hypothesis, showing that 
they are equally important in generating cooperative moves in public goods experiments. He 
observed that, in the iterated game, the reduction in confusion is first replaced by a growth in 
kindness, followed by a movement towards the Nash equilibrium —or zero cooperation scenario. 
However, he realized that the decrease in cooperation was not the result of learning the free-riding 
incentives but the consequence of frustrated attempts at kindness; suggesting that the focus on 
“learning” in experimental research should shift to include studies of preferences for cooperation. 
In other words, kindness can be fundamental for strategies —so the potential explanations for 
cooperation, together with learning hypothesis, should also include this factor. 
Another mistaken assumption made in early investigations was that individuals consider self-
interest only and interpreted the decline in cooperation as a preference for free-riding. Against this 
background, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) argued that many people prefer to cooperate 
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provided that others also cooperate, which is inconsistent with the self-interest argument. So they 
decided to add into the equation the “other-regarding preferences” to explain the conditionally 
cooperative behavior that they previously in the iterated PGG. All in all, they pointed out the 
existence of conditional cooperators that reduce their contribution when observing others free-
riding, a scenario that leads to the decline in cooperation in the repeated game —note that this 
remark is parallel to Andreoni’s observation stating that the decline of cooperation is the result of 
frustrated attempts at kindness.  
For such reason, Fischbacher and Gächter indicated that human behavior in the PGG can be better 
described through a combination of the self-regarding preference and the other-regarding 
preference. They showed that these imperfect conditional cooperators who match others’ 
contributions only partly are the vast majority of individuals. Dong et al., (2016), noted that this 
behavior implies that the voluntary cooperation in PGG is inherently fragile. These authors 
broaden the argument, stating that even if there are no free riders in the group, imperfect 
conditional cooperators will decrease their contribution because of the self-regarding preference. 
In consequence, Fischbacher and Gächter already suggested that other mechanisms such as 
punishment and rewards must be implemented to sustain cooperation.  
In this last respect (Dong et al., 2016), most empirical and theoretical research on PGG indicates 
that incentives — rewards and/or punishment— can curb free-riding. These incentives can be 
decentralized —peer incentives— or centralized —institutional incentives, and, for both types, 
theoretical research and experiments have determined that the effect of rewards is not the same as 
the effect of punishment. In particular, previous studies have found punishment to be more 
effective than reward for maintaining cooperation in public goods games. There is also a crucial 
difference between centralized and decentralized incentives; peer incentives encourage 
contribution in both punishment and rewards, but for institutional incentives only punishment 
successfully increases the contribution of the penalized ones. Accordingly, in the institutional 
rewards experiments levels of contribution are not significantly above the standard levels.  
Rand et al. (2009), in an experimental setting with peer incentives and where player identities 
persisted from round to round, showed that reward is as effective as punishment for maintaining 
public cooperation in the repeated PGG and leads to higher total earnings. They argue that what is 
essential for maintaining cooperation in the repeated PGG is the possibility of targeted interactions 
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more generally, regardless if that is in the form of punishment or reward. However, while 
punishment is costly for both parties, reward creates benefit and thus results in higher total payoffs. 
Furthermore, when both punishment and reward are possible, they advocate that positive 
reciprocity supersedes negative reciprocity, and punishing results in lower group-level benefits.  
Consequently, they question the proposal that costly punishment is the optimal force for prompting 
cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2000); and they point out that it can be inappropriate for several 
reasons. First, costly punishment generates a social loss by reducing both players’ payoffs. In 
addition, punishment could be used by free riders against cooperators, either randomly or as acts 
of revenge. And last, the extent to which punishment is perceived as justified greatly affects the 
response of those who have been punished. In conclusion, they find that reward outperforms 
punishment in repeated public goods games and that human cooperation in such repeated settings 
is best supported by positive interactions with others —i.e. positive reciprocity should play a more 
important role than negative reciprocity in maintaining public cooperation in repeated situations.  
Regarding the costs of punishment, Boyd et al. (2010) conducted a model of coordinated 
punishment to capture the fact that the total cost of punishing a free-rider declines as the number 
of punishers increases —because the costs are shared. Beforehand we knew that as punishment 
increases it reduces more and more the gain to free-riding, so groups with more punishment can 
sustain more cooperation. Nevertheless, it should be also taken into account that punishment can 
reduce the average payoffs of groups members because the costs of it may exceed the gains from 
cooperation. In this scenario, punishers, in order to survive, must engage in enough punishment of 
defectors so that the induced cooperation more than offsets the cost of punishing. Thus, rare 
punishers do not have the benefit of outnumbering their targets, because the cost of punishing a 
free-rider is substantial and they usually bear the cost alone rather than sharing it. 
As an extension of Rand et al. (2009), who concluded that rewarding can be as effective as 
punishment for maintaining public cooperation, Szolnoki and Perc (2010) investigated the impact 
of reward on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial PGG by means of the introduction of a 
third strategy in addition to the traditional cooperator and defector —therefore, it is a theoretical 
study, not experimental. This third strategy is called “rewarding cooperators”, cooperators willing 
to reward other cooperators even if this implies bearing an additional cost. Furthermore, they find 
that costly rewards facilitate cooperation more effectively if the synergetic effects of cooperation 
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are low —i.e. a low multiplication factor— and, surprisingly enough, their results indicate 
that high rewards may be less effective in promoting cooperation than moderate rewards.  
These authors also point out that, at high multiplication factors, the network of reciprocity is 
enough to decimate defectors, and then the impact of reward just consists on establishing the victor 
between traditional cooperators and rewarding cooperators —i.e. the profit margin is too low. 
However, they find that the promotion of cooperation by means of costly rewards still seems 
altogether less efficient compared to costly punishment. In this respect, they argue that for reward 
to work equally well as punishment, the ratio between the benefit and the cost of rewarding must 
be significantly higher than in the case of punishment. This reasoning follows from the fact that, 
in the absence of defectors, the punishing cooperators become equivalent to the cooperators while 
rewarding cooperators still keep paying the cost of reward and therefore remain inferior to the 
strategy of traditional cooperators —or as they call them, the second-order free-riders.  
Lastly, let me add that in order to analyze the data I have collected throughout the course of my 
own PGG experiments, I will try to consider the remarks of the authors I have just reviewed. Also, 
as I have already mentioned in the hypothesis, I will try to argue which incentive is better to sustain 
cooperation according to the data I have collected. Therefore, with the experiment I describe 












3. The Public Goods Game 
To understand how individuals behave in the public goods setting, the tools provided by 
experimental economics are quite useful. In a nutshell, this branch of economic science consists 
on the application of experimental methods to study economic questions. The data provided in this 
kind of experiments helps us to test the validity of economic theories and illuminate market 
mechanisms. For such reason, I am confident that the application of the experimental method I 
describe below will help us understand the economic question that concerns us.  
I will analyze a game called “Public Goods Game” —from now on PGG— to understand how 
individuals behave in a framework where subjects try to achieve a common goal —the funding of 
the public goods. In our setting participants secretly choose how many of their private tokens —
also called “points” or “monetary units”— to contribute to a group project —the public pot. In the 
shared pot contributions are multiplied by a factor greater than one and less than the total number 
of players and the resulting number is evenly divided among players. Those who contribute below 
average or nothing will be called “free riders” or “defectors”, as opposed to the above-average 
contributors who are called “cooperators” (Systems Innovation, 2017). 
In this experiment, the group total payoff is maximized when all players contribute all of their 
tokens to the group project, but each is incentivized to do otherwise as keeping their money will 
render them the potential greatest payoff regardless of what everyone else does —those are “the 
free-rider incentives”. However, experimental research has shown that most of the time individuals 
still decide to cooperate —Marwell & Ames (1981) found that subjects generally provide the 
public goods at levels halfway between the Pareto efficient level and the free riding level— and, 
as a result, the outcome goes most of the time against the notion of what the equilibrium should be 
according to economic theory. Thus, the Nash Equilibrium —zero contributions scenario— is 
rarely seen, and it is completely opposed to the social optimum equilibrium —where the total 
payoff is maximized.  
Public Goods Games can also be analyzed as a social dilemma where each person benefits by 
consuming the tokens that others contribute, while contributing himself as little as possible. 
However, if everyone behaves this way there would be no additional tokens to enjoy. For such 
reason, public good games are usually employed to model the behavior of groups of individuals 
trying to achieve a common goal —a public good from which all may benefit regardless of whether 
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they contribute to its financing. Most public goods are collectively shared and once they are being 
provisioned it is difficult to exclude people from them and, as a result, there is a temptation to 
enjoy the good without making a contribution. Surprisingly enough is rational to free ride, but if 
all do so the public good is not provided and everybody is worse off. Thus, again, the question is: 
How could we promote contributions to boost “social welfare”?  
To address the proposed questions, and test the validity of my hypothesis I have designed my own 
PGG experiment. The free web-based platform Lioness.com —run by the Universität Passau— 
has provided all the necessary tools to make a proper design for the experiment, as well as 
“example experiments” upon which I have based my own —in particular the published PGG 
experiment by Arechar, Gaechter & Molleman (2018). I will detail the experimental design on the 
next chapter, but for now I will advance that, in order to suit my research interests, I had to set up 
a public goods game experiment with punishment opportunities and another one with rewarding 
opportunities. In this way, I have been able to compare the results of both experiments and reach 
some conclusions regarding the questions I pretended to analyze.  
Once the experiment was already designed, I had to deal with the difficult task of finding enough 
participants to legitimate the results of the experiment. I lacked access to a laboratory to test 
massively my hypothesis, but finally I managed to find a considerable number of participants. Due 
to material limitations and Covid-19 restrictions, the experiment was performed over a whole 
week, segmented into separate sessions of 4 subjects. Participants were able to interact online in 
order to fulfill the requirements of the experiment. All the results were collected in Excel tables to 






4. The experimental design 
The overall design of the experiment consists of a control experiment with two treatments 
conditions. All of them share the basic characteristics of PGG experiments, where there are several 
groups of N players (N=4) that interact anonymously for a number of rounds (T=10 rounds). In 
each round, each player receives a given number of monetary units (y=20 m.u.) and must decide 
freely and anonymously which amount to contribute. Each member can either contribute all their 
tokens, just part of them or decide to fully free-ride and not contribute at all. Players keep the 
tokens they do not contribute and they are told so. Once all players have taken a decision, 
contributions are  multiplied by the synergy factor (r=1.6) and evenly divided among the members 
of the group. I have set a low synergy factor, following Rand et al. (2009), who found that costly 
rewards facilitate cooperation more effectively if the synergetic effects of cooperation are low.  
At the beginning of each experiment I provide the instructions of the game to each player. They 
contain an explanation about how the experiment works and also a few examples to illustrate it. In 
the instructions, parameter values of N, T, y and r are clearly stated —i.e. they are made common 
knowledge. Moreover, prior to start the experiment, players are asked to answer a few “Control 
Questions” about the basics of the experiment. This will show to what degree participants 
understood their task, and it will serve me as to observe whether this has a connection with their 
performance in the game. Once they have written the answers, the system will take them to the 
lobby, where they will have to wait until a group of four can be created. Then, each experiment 
will start following its particular functioning.  
As I have said, the overall design of the experiment consists of three different settings. On the one 
hand, the Control Experiment (“Case Study 1”), which is the standard iterated PGG. On the other, 
the two treatment conditions, that differ from the Control Experiment in that each round is followed 
by a second stage that allows targeted interactions at each other group member. In the first 
treatment (“Case study 2”), I have allowed for peer punishment opportunities at the end of each 
round —i.e. each member of the group, if deemed necessary, can assign “Punishment Points” to 
other members. And, in the second treatment (“Case Study 3”), there are peer rewarding 
opportunities after each round —i.e. each member of the group, if deemed necessary, can assign 
“Rewarding Points” to other members. Below, I describe more accurately each of the designs: 
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• Case study 1 (control experiment): “STANDARD ITERATED PGG” 
The control experiment is the standard iterated PGG where players interact anonymously without 
any kind of incentive for a number t of rounds (T=10). In each round, players receive an 
endowment of y monetary units (y=20) and simultaneously decide how much to contribute (0 ≤ 
ci ≤ y) in the public pot. Then, contributions are multiplied by the synergy factor (r=1.6) and evenly 
divided among the members of the group (N=4). This process is repeated ten times, but subjects 
are not told the number of rounds Note that, for a given group, the payoff of each subject i in period 
t is given by: 
	𝜋!" = 𝑦 − 𝑐! + (	𝑟	𝑐"̅) 







               
The instructions provided to participants are the following:  
- Your task. At the beginning of each round, each participant receives 20 Points. You have 
to decide how many of the 20 Points you want to contribute to a group project. The other 
three members of your group make this decision at the same time. 
- The Points you do not contribute, you keep for yourself. These Points are added to your 
total.  
- After all group members have made their decision, all Points contributed to the group 
project are added up, and this number of Points is multiplied by 1.6. 
- The resulting number of Points is then divided equally among the group members 
(irrespective of how much they individually contributed to the group project).  
- In summary, your income in a round = the points you keep for yourself plus the points you 
receive from the group project. 
Also, in order to illustrate how the experiment works, I also provide the following examples: 
Group Project - Example 1:  
- All 4 players contribute 20 Points to the group project. 
- Sum of contributions is 80 Points.  
- This amount is multiplied by 1.6, resulting in 128 Points. 
- Each participant receives (128/4 =) 32 Points from the group project. 
(1) 
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- Therefore, the income of each player is 32 Points. 
Group Project - Example 2:  
- Participants A, B and C contribute each 20 Points to the group project. 
- Participant D contributes 0 Points.  
- Sum of contributions is 60 Points. 
- This amount is multiplied by 1.6, resulting in 96 Points. 
- Each participant receives (96/4 =) 24 Points from the group project. 
- Therefore, the income of Participants A, B and C is  24 Points from the group project. 
- The, income of Participant D is 44 Points (20 kept for himself plus 24 from the group 
project).  
Finally, in order to check whether participants understood or not the instructions of the game, 
participants are asked to answer a few questions regarding the functioning of the experiment. It is 
not required to answer them correctly nor to answer all of them in order to continue and start the 
experiment; participants are told that this is just to be able to draw conclusions and, accordingly, 
will not affect their final score.  
 First question: At the start of a round, each group member receives 20 Points. Suppose 
nobody (including you) contributes any Points to the project.  
a. How many points would you earn? (Correct answer: 20 Points). 
b. How many Points would each of the other members earn? (Correct answer: 20 Points). 
 Second question: Suppose the other three members of your group each contribute 20 Points 
to the project.  
a. How many points would you earn if you contribute 20 Points? (Correct answer: 32 
Points). 
b. How many Points would you earn if you contribute 0 Points? (Correct answer: 44 
Points). 




• Case study 2 (first treatment condition): “PGG WITH PEER PUNISHMENT”  
Treatment experiment A is a variation of the iterated PGG where players have the opportunity to 
punish its group mates bearing a cost. It differs from the Control Experiment in that each game is 
followed by a second stage that allows targeted interactions (in this treatment, peer punishment 
opportunities) at each other group member. The other characteristics coincide with the standard 
game; therefore players also interact anonymously for a number of 10 rounds, they receive 20 
monetary units and should decide how much to contribute. Then, contributions are multiplied by 
the synergy factor (r=1.6) and evenly divided among the members of the group (n=4). But here, 
there is another stage where players have the opportunity to punish at a cost for themselves —i.e. 
to assign “Deduction Points”. For each “Deduction Point” “d” players assign, 3 points will be 
deducted from the total of the recipient, and 1 point will be deducted from the punisher. This whole 
process will be also repeated ten times and, once again, subjects are not told the number of rounds. 
Finally, for a given group, the payoff of each subject i in period t is given by: 
	𝜋!" = 𝑦 − 𝑐! + (	𝑟	𝑐"̅) − 𝑑 − 𝑃%                







    
and 





*The estimate of the probability of being punished was taken from Fehr & Gächter (2000).  
The instructions provided to participants are the following:  
In STAGE 1: 
- YOUR TASK; at the beginning of each round, each participant receives 20 Points. You 
have to decide how many of the 20 Points you want to contribute to a group project. The 
other three members of your group make this decision at the same time. 
- The Points you do not contribute, you keep for yourself. These Points are added to your 
total.  
- After all group members have made their decision, all Points contributed to the group 
project are added up, and this number of Points is multiplied by 1.6.  
(2) 
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- The resulting number of Points is then divided equally among the group members 
(irrespective of how much they individually contributed to the group project).  
- In summary, your income in a round = the Points you keep for yourself plus the Points you 
receive from the group project 
* At the end of Stage I, you will be informed of the average contributions to the group project, 
and your earnings in the round so far. Then, Stage II begins. 
In STAGE 2: 
- At the beginning of Stage II, you are informed of the contributions to the group project of 
each of the other group members. You will have the opportunity to assign Deduction Points 
to each of them. 
- For each Deduction Point you assign, 3 Points will be deducted from the total of the 
recipient, and 1 Point will be deducted from your total.  
- In each round, you can assign between 0 and 10 Deduction Points to each of the other 
members of your group. 
Also, in order to illustrate how the experiment works, I provide the following examples after the 
instructions of each stage (examples for the first stage are the same as the ones provided for the 
“Control experiment”, here I only provide the examples for the second stage):  
Deduction Points - Example:  
- You are informed of the contributions of each of the other members of your group. 
-  You assign the following Deduction Points to Participants A, B and C: 2, 0 and 3. 
-  This reduces your earnings in this round by (2+0+3=) 5 Points. 
-  The other participants assign a total of 4 Deduction Points to you. 
-  This reduces your earnings in this round by (4x3=) 12 Points. 
- In Stage II of this round, your total earnings reduction due to Deduction Points is 
(5+12=) 17 Points.  
Finally, in order to check whether participants understood or not the instructions of the game, 
participants are asked to answer a few questions regarding the functioning of the experiment. It is 
not required to answer them correctly nor to answer all of them in order to continue and start the 
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experiment; participants are told that this is just to be able to draw conclusions and, accordingly, 
will not affect their final score. Down below I provide the aforementioned questions: 
First question: At the start of a round, each group member receives 20 Points. Suppose nobody 
(including you) contributes any Points to the project.  
a. How many points do you earn in Stage 1? (Correct answer: 20 Points). 
b. How many Points do the other members of your group earn? (Correct answer: 20 —or 
60— Points). 
 Second question: At the start of a round, each group member receives 20 Points. Suppose 
the other three group members contribute a total of 40 Points in total to the group project. Now 
suppose you contribute 0 Points to the group project. 
a. How many Points will each player receive from the group project? (Correct answer: 
16 Points). 
b. How many Points will you earn in Stage I of this round? (Correct answer: 36 Points). 
 Third question: At the start of a round, each group member receives 20 Points. Suppose 
that again, the other three group members contribute a total of 40 Points to the group project. Now 
suppose you contribute 10 Points to the group project. 
a. How many Points will each player receive from the group project? (Correct answer: 
20 Points). 
b. How many Points will you earn in Stage I of this round? (Correct answer: 30 Points). 
 Fourth question: Suppose that in Stage II you assign the following Reward Points to the 
other members of your group: 2, 0 and 5. 
a. How many Points will be deducted from your total by assigning these Points? (Correct 
answer: 7 Points). 
 Fifth question: Suppose that in Stage II the other members of your group assign a total of 
5 Reward Points to you. 
a. How many Points will be added to your total by having these Points assigned to you? 
(Correct answer: 15 Points). 
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*This is the link that shows the review version of the first treatment condition: https://lioness.uni-
passau.de/bin/function/getGameDetails.php?c=YToyOntzOjQ6ImNvZGUiO3M6NjoieHgyM3N
yIjtzOjY6ImlkR2FtZSI7czo1OiIyNDM3MCI7fQ== 
• Case study 3 (second treatment condition): “PGG WITH PEER REWARDING” 
Treatment experiment B is an iterated PGG where players have the opportunity to reward its group 
mates bearing a cost for themselves. It differs from the Control Experiment in that each game is 
followed by a second stage that allows targeted interactions (in this treatment, peer rewarding 
opportunities) at each other group member. The other characteristics coincide with the standard 
game; therefore, players also interact anonymously for a number of 10 rounds, they receive 20 
monetary units and should decide how much to contribute. Then, contributions are multiplied by 
the synergy factor (r=1.6) and evenly divided among the members of the group (n=4). But here, 
there is another stage where players have the opportunity to reward at a cost for themselves (for 
each assigned “Reward Point” “s”, 3 points will be added to the total of the recipient, and 1 point 
will be deducted from the rewarder. This whole process will be also repeated ten times and, once 
again, subjects are not told the number of rounds.  Finally, for a given group, the payoff of each 
subject i in period t is given by: 
	𝜋!" = 𝑦 − 𝑐! + (	𝑟	𝑐"̅) − 𝑠 + 𝑃&                







    
and 
𝑃& (probability of being rewarded)  
The instructions provided to participants are the following:  
In STAGE 1: 
- YOUR TASK; at the beginning of each round, each participant receives 20 Points. You 
have to decide how many of the 20 Points you want to contribute to a group project. The 
other three members of your group make this decision at the same time. 
- The Points you do not contribute, you keep for yourself, and will be added to your total.  
- After all group members have made their decision, all Points contributed to the group 
project are added up, and this number of Points is multiplied by 1.6.  
 (3) 
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- The resulting number of Points is then divided equally among the group members 
(irrespective of how much they individually contributed to the group project).  
- In summary, your income in a round = the Points you keep for yourself plus the Points you 
receive from the group project 
 
* At the end of Stage I, you will be informed of the average contributions to the group project, 
and your earnings in the round so far. Then, Stage II begins. 
In STAGE 2: 
- At the beginning of Stage II, you are informed of the contributions to the group project of 
each of the other group members. You will have the opportunity to assign Reward Points 
to each of them. 
- For each Reward Point you assign, 3 Points will be added to the total of the recipient, and 
1 Point will be deducted from your total.  
- In each round, you can assign between 0 and 10 Reward Points to each of the other 
members of your group. 
Also, in order to illustrate how the experiment works, I provide the following examples after the 
instructions of each stage (examples for the first stage are the same as the ones provided for the 
Control experiment; here I just provide the examples for the second stage):  
Reward Points - Example:  
- You are informed of the contributions of each of the other members of your group. 
- You assign the following Reward Points to Participants A, B and C: 2, 0 and 3. 
- This reduces your earnings in this round by (2+0+3=) 5 Points. 
- The other participants assign a total of 4 Reward Points to you. 
- This increases your earnings in this round by (4x3=) 12 Points. 
- In Stage II of this round, your total earnings increase due to Deduction Points is (12-5=) 
7 Points.  
Finally, in order to check whether participants understood or not the instructions of the game, 
participants are asked to answer a few questions regarding the functioning of the experiment. It is 
not required to answer them correctly nor to answer all of them in order to continue and start the 
experiment; participants are told that this is just to be able to draw conclusions and, accordingly, 
will not affect their final score.  
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 First question: At the start of a round, each group member receives 20 Points. Suppose 
nobody (including you) contributes any Points to the project.  
a. How many points do you earn in Stage 1? (Correct answer: 20 Points). 
b. How many Points do the other members of your group earn? (Correct answer: 20 —or 
60— Points). 
 Second question: At the start of a round, each group member receives 20 Points. Suppose 
the other three group members contribute a total of 40 Points in total to the group project. Now 
suppose you contribute 0 Points to the group project. 
a. How many Points will each player receive from the group project? (Correct answer: 
16 Points). 
b. How many Points will you earn in Stage I of this round? (Correct answer: 36 Points). 
 Third question: At the start of a round, each group member receives 20 Points. Suppose 
that again, the other three group members contribute a total of 40 Points to the group project. Now 
suppose you contribute 10 Points to the group project. 
a. How many Points will each player receive from the group project? (Correct answer: 
20 Points). 
b. How many Points will you earn in Stage I of this round? (Correct answer: 30 Points). 
 Fourth question: Suppose that in Stage II you assign the following Reward Points to the 
other members of your group: 2, 0 and 5. 
a. How many Points will be deducted from your total by assigning these Points? (Correct 
answer: 7 Points). 
 Fifth question: Suppose that in Stage II the other members of your group assign a total of 
5 Reward Points to you. 
a. How many Points will be added to your total by having these Points assigned to you? 
(Correct answer: 15 Points). 
 




5. Results of the experiment 
A total of 68 individuals participated in this study at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Due 
to material limitations and Covid-19 restrictions, the experiment was performed over a whole 
week, segmented into separate sessions of 4 or 8 subjects. In order to control the entrance to the 
experiment and secure reliable results individuals were subject to IP address recognitions. As 
indicated in the experimental design, participants interacted anonymously for a number of 10 
rounds in permanent groups of four. As shown in Table 1, a total number of 17 groups of 4 
individuals participated in the experiment. A number of 7 groups and 28 subjects participated in 
the Control experiment (i.e. the Standard PGG) and, the first and the second treatment, had a 
participation of 5 groups of 4 individuals each.   
                                 Table 1 – Group Composition 
     
    Case Study 1  Case Study 2  Case Study 3 
         Control experiment         First treatment           Second treatment 
         (Standard Iterated       (Peer punishment          (Peer rewarding 
        PGG)            opportunities)              opportunities) 
  
Participants        7 groups of size 4        5 groups of size 4        5 groups of size 4 
 
 
• Case study 1 (Control experiment): “STANDARD ITERATED PGG”  
First of all, the data regarding the degree of understanding before starting the game is shown in  
Table 2 —calculations are based upon the percentage of correct answers in the “Control 
Questions”, that check whether participants understood or not the provided instructions. Overall, 
subjects seem to have understood the first question (see them in page 12) asking  for the payoff 
received if no one contributed any point to the group project. Therefore, most of the participants 
are able to predict their payoff in the absence of cooperation. However, this understanding 
significantly decreases in the second question —specifically in part b. As a result, prior to the 
game, approximately half of participants seem to do not understand the dynamics of the game in 
the presence of contributions —in particular, the impact on payoff of cooperating or not 
cooperating at all. More than 60% of the participants do not realize the incentives of free riding —
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reflected in question 2.b.— and hence this could partially explain the relatively higher levels of 
cooperation at the beginning of the game. Thereby, the reason of the unsteadily decrease being the   
                 Table 2 – Initial understanding of the Standard PGG 
 
   Percentage of correct answers in Control Questions 
  
    Question 1.a.    71,43 % 
    Question 1.b.    64,29 % 
    Question 2.a.    60,71 % 
    Question 2.b    39,29 % 
 
Regarding the results of the experiment, in Figure 1 we see the mean contribution per round in the 
standard iterated PGG. In the first period, on average, subjects have contributed 14 m.u. or, 
equivalently, 70% of their endowments. Then, we observe a sustained drop on cooperation until 
we reach an apparent stabilization at 9 m.u. in the final rounds (periods 7, 8, 9 and 10). Therefore, 
in just a few rounds, the level of cooperation has been cut down by nearly a half. In addition, we 
observe that, on average, individuals contribute half of their endowments (mean contribution of 
the game: 𝑐̅ = 11.07). The bottom line of this trend is that, for some reason that we will discuss 












Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10
Mean Contribution (Standard Iterated PGG)
progressive acknowledgment of the free-
riding incentives as the game progresses. 
All in all, the degree of understanding 
prior to the game indicate that subjects 
cannot be  totally consistent with their 
beliefs due to an overall poor 
understanding of the instructions, so 
even if they only care about their 
individual payoffs, this is cannot be 
initially reflected in their behavior. 
Figure 1 – Mean Contribution (nominated in m.u.) in the Standard Iterated Public Goods Game. 
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some reason, cooperation do not vanish and it is still persistent. Knowing that the payoff function 
significantly depends on the level of cooperation —as seen in equation (1)—, it comes with no 
surprise the decline also on payoffs depicted in Figure 2. Therefore, we observe that, as 
cooperation declines, individual payoff decreases accordingly.  
Figure 3 shows the percentage of the maximum possible payoff achieved in each round. 
Remember that maximum payoff  in a round is achieved if and only if all subjects of the group 
contribute their entire endowment to the “group project” —i.e. full cooperation. However, this is 
not the case for any of the rounds in the Control experiment, hence in all rounds total payoff is just 
a fraction of the maximum possible payoff. Once again, as payoff declines with cooperation, the 
function is nearly full downward-sloping, meaning that the achieved payoff over the maximum 
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Percentage of maximum possible payoff (Standard Iterated PGG)
Figure 2 – Mean Payoff (nominated in m.u.) in the Standard Iterated Public Goods Game. 
Figure 3 – Percentage of maximum possible payoff in the Standard Iterated Public Goods Game. 
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• Case study 2 (first treatment condition): “PGG WITH PEER PUNISHMENT”  
To begin with, the data regarding the degree of understanding before starting the game is shown 
in Table 3. It seems that 3 out of 4 participants understood part “a” and “b” of the first question 
(see them in page 15). Consequently, most subjects are able to predict their payoff in the absence 
of cooperation and understood rightly that they keep for themselves the points they do not 
contribute. Just as in the previous case, understanding significantly decreases in the second 
question. The percentage of correct answers is almost the same for the second and the third 
question, meaning that, before starting the game, more than half of the participants were unable to  
                                                                                              Table 3 – Initial understanding of the PGG with       
          punishment 
 
Percentage of correct answers in Control Questions 
  
 Question 1.a.    75 % 
 Question 1.b.    75 % 
 Question 2.a.    40 % 
 Question 2.b.    35 % 
 Question 3.a.    45 % 
 Question 3.b.    35 % 
 Question 4.    50 % 
 Question 5.    60 % 
 
“Deduction Points” —first for the punisher and, then, for the recipient. Thus, approximately half 
of participants understand how punishing works even before starting the game. 
Regarding the data I have collected from the first treatment condition —i.e. punishment 
opportunities after each round—, in Figure 4 we observe how in this case the mean contribution 
has been extraordinarily stable throughout the whole experiment. This is so much the case that 
the highest mean contribution took place in the last round —exactly the opposite from what we 
observed in the Standard Iterated PGG. In all but the first round, contributions remained stable 
predict their payoffs if either they, 
their group members or both decided 
to cooperate. Therefore, once again, a 
significant part of the subjects that 
participated in the experiment do not 
understand the dynamics of the game 
in the presence of contributions. While 
participants initially do not realize the 
incentives of free-riding, we observe 
that at least 40% them understood that 
increasing cooperation yields a higher 
group payoff —reflected in part “a” of 
questions 2 and 3. Understanding 
improves a bit in questions 4 and 5, 
asking for the cost of assigning 
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between the gap [15,16] and the average contribution has been 16 m.u —or, equivalently, 80% 
of the initial endowment. Therefore, it seems that the treatment condition succeeded to prevent 
the fall of cooperation in the final rounds that we observed in the Standard PGG —in the 
discussion we will further elaborate on these effects. 
In this case, the payoff function does not only depend on the level of cooperation, instead it is a 
function of contributions and deductions. As a result, the correlation between the mean 
contribution and the mean payoff is much more ambiguous than before. In Figure 5, we observe 
that, even if contributions remained stable, the payoff declines with repetition, but why? Indeed, 
this results could be counter-intuitive if we ignore the usage of punishment throughout the rounds, 
but if we do take a look also on Figure 7 —the usage of punishment— we will see that this 
reduction of payoffs coincides with an increase of punishment —that harms the payoff of both the 
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Mean Payoff  (PGG with peer punishment)
Figure 4 – Mean Contribution (nominated in m.u.) in the PGG with peer punishment. 
Figure 5 – Mean Payoff  (nominated in m.u.) in the PGG with peer punishment. 
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Nevertheless, before going any further, we see in Figure 6 the percentage of maximum possible 
payoff that has been achieved in each round. Note that, in the case of punishment, the maximum 
payoff is still achieved when every member of the group contributes their entire endowment to the 
“group project” and besides does not assign any “Deduction Point”. As we have already seen, this 
is not the case for any of the rounds and, accordingly, total payoff is just a fraction of the maximum 
possible payoff. This figure follows the same trend as the latter and hence we observe how the 
percentage of maximum payoff declines with repetition.  
Finally, in Figure 7 is shown the usage of punishment throughout the game. Note, that it has an 
increasing tendency, as opposed to the decreasing fashion of payoff functions. Also, in the second-
last round —round 9— the use of punishment surges to be cut down in the last round, most likely 
due to the finite horizon of the game —as the cost of punishing in the last round cannot be offset 
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Useage of punishment
Figure 6 – Percentage of maximum possible payoff in the PGG with peer punishment. 
Figure 7 – Use of punishment throughout the PGG with peer punishment. 
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• Case study 3 (second treatment experiment): “PGG WITH PEER REWARDING”  
Once again, let us first comment the data regarding the degree of understanding before starting the 
game —see Table 4. More than half of the participants answered correctly the first question (see 
them in page 18). However, the rate of correct answers decreases a little bit when participants are 
                                                                                        Table 4 – Initial understanding of the PGG w/ Reward 
 
Percentage of correct answers in Control Questions 
  
 Question 1.a.    65 % 
 Question 1.b.    60 % 
 Question 2.a.    65 % 
 Question 2.b.    50 % 
 Question 3.a.    45 % 
 Question 3.b.    35 % 
 Question 4.    90 % 
 Question 5.    90 % 
the third question asking for the group and individual payoffs if both group members and yourself 
contribute part of your initial endowment. More than half of the participants failed “part a” and 
just a third answered correctly “part b”. This results provide more evidence, that approximately 
half of the participants do not understand the dynamics of the experiment before starting the 
game. However, most participants rightly understood how “Reward Points” work, both the cost 
of assigning them  —fourth question —and the benefit of receiving them —fifth question.  
Regarding the results of the experiment, in Figure 8 we see the mean contribution in each round 
in the PGG with peer rewarding. On average, in the first round participants have contributed 13 
m.u. or, equivalently, 65% of their endowments to the group project. We then observe a sudden 
drop that is quickly stabilized in period 4, this also reflected on a higher usage of “Reward Points” 
in this same round —see Figure 11, showing how this sudden increase of contributions coincides 
with a higher usage of rewarding.  In the following rounds, mean contributions are at least at 12 
m.u. with a peak at 14 m.u. in period 9. Therefore, we see how in the PGG experiment with 
asked for their payoff in the presence 
of cooperation (second question). It 
seems that, once more, participants do 
not realize the incentives of free 
riding —i.e. they fail to predict the 
higher payoff that would result from a 
non-cooperating scenario. The 
situation is therefore quite similar to 
the previous cases, as participants 
understand better the situations where 
the sum of contributions is zero, but 
fail to predict their payoffs in the 
presence of cooperation. The 
understanding worsens even more in 
t  t ir   
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rewarding opportunities contributions do not fall with repetition —instead, they are stable and 
they even rise in some rounds. In addition, we observe that, on average, individuals contribute 
approximately 60% of their endowments. The bottom line of this trend is that, for a reason that 







In Figure 9, we observe that the mean individual payoff depends on the level of cooperation even 
in the presence of peer incentives —recall that, in the first treatment, this relation was much more 
ambiguous. Every time that cooperation falls, individual payoffs fall accordingly —and vice versa. 
Also note that individual payoffs are much higher than in the previous cases. Finally, it is 
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Figure 8 – Mean Contribution (nominated in m.u.) in the PGG with peer rewarding. 
Figure 9 – Mean Payoff  (nominated in m.u.) in the PGG with peer rewarding. 
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Figure 10 shows the percentage of maximum possible payoff that has been achieved in each round 
in the PGG experiment with peer rewarding. However, in this case, the maximum payoff that can 
be achieved is a combination of a full cooperation scenario and the assignment of the highest 
possible number of “Rewarding Points” —each individual can assign a maximum of 10 per round. 
As a result, this yields a much higher maximum possible payoff, but still percentages are slightly 
higher than the ones of the punishment treatment. 
Finally, in Figure 11 we see the average usage of “Rewarding Points” in each round. As we have 
already commented, the use of reward initially decreases but, in period 4, there is a sudden increase 
of them that coincides with a surge of cooperation in this same round and, consequently, an 
increase of the mean payoff. Finally, let me highlight that the usage of rewarding does not only 
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Useage of rewarding
Figure 10 – Percentage of maximum possible payoff in the PGG with peer rewarding. 
Figure 11 – Use of punishment throughout the PGG with peer rewarding. 
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6. Discussion of the results 
First of all, these results verify that a significant part of the participants did not fully understand 
the instructions. In all cases, at least half of them, cannot predict their payoff in the presence of 
contributions and do not realize the free riding incentives. This lack of understanding could play 
an important role in the sustained drop in cooperation that we observe in the control experiment 
—i.e. the Standard Iterated PGG— due to the potential learning outcomes that participants can get 
as the game progresses. Therefore, understanding will inevitably increase over the course of the 
experiment and thus participants will realize the free-riding incentives as well as other aspects of 
the game that they did not comprehend before. As a result, subjects whose aim is to maximize 
individual payoff, will realize that free-riding can be the best strategy to achieve it and will cut 
down their contributions. Also, as the game progresses participants are able to develop more 
complex strategies that will better suit their objectives.  
An alternative explanation to the decline of cooperation in the Standard PGG is that subjects have 
a natural bias to initially cooperate, that is suppressed as a result of frustrated attempts at kindness 
(Andreoni, 1995). Throughout the game they realize that most of the time increasing their 
contribution harms their payoff and, on top of that, their group members decrease their 
contributions when observing a top contributor in their group. Finally, seeing that the strategy of 
defectors —below average contributors— yields higher payoffs, they decide to cut down their 
contributions as well. Also, we must consider that the cause of the decline in cooperation could be 
a combination of both the aforementioned factors—i.e. the progressive learning over the course of 
the game and the frustrated attempts at kindness. Regardless of the reason, we should still take into 
account that the behavior of participants in the starting rounds can mismatch their own beliefs and 
is undeniable that in the first rounds participants showed a bias towards cooperation.  
Still on this topic, in the treatment conditions, most participants have understood correctly the 
functioning of “Reward Points”. The understanding of “Deduction Points” has been significantly 
lower but still percentages are above 50%. The poorer understanding of deduction, could have 
something to do with the fact that punishing is costly, harming both the payoff of the punisher and 
the punished. This can be counter-intuitive because participants could think that they do not 
deserve to incur additional costs just to punish free-riders. Rewarding is costly too, but just for the 
rewarder, causing that the overall result of rewarding is still a surplus, as for each “Reward Point” 
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you assign you lose just one point and the recipient receives three. Finally, let me remark once 
again that the understanding of the incentives has been considerably higher than on the previous 
questions; perhaps because in our society we are already familiar with this kind of incentives 
schemes. 
Regarding the overall results of the experiment, we will take advantage from the following 
combined graphs to complement the discussion. In Figure 12, it is clear that both treatments —
punishment and reward— have succeeded to prevent the decline of contributions —in this respect 
they seem equally efficient. However, there are also substantial differences between the two; while 
the average contribution of the PGG with peer rewarding (𝑐̅ = 11,98) has been just slightly above 
the one of the Standard PGG (𝑐 ̅ = 11,07), the average contribution of the PGG with peer 
punishment has been much higher (𝑐 ̅= 15,92). In this respect, the punishment treatment has been 
significantly more efficient than reward in promoting cooperation; but at what cost?  
 
To answer this last question, we must compare the payoffs that have been achieved in each of the 
studied cases. Figure 13 shows the mean payoff in both the control and the treatment experiments. 
In the graph we can observe how peer rewarding has been the most successful variation in this 
respect and peer punishment the worse. Even if punishment prompted higher contributions, this 
has not implied higher payoffs due to the costs of punishing. In the PGG, punishing produces a 
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Standard PGG PGG (peer punishment) PGG (peer rewarding)
Figure 12 – Mean contribution in each variation of the PGG. 
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produces social welfare improvements. These results indicate that the most efficient incentive 
scheme in increasing payoffs has been peer rewarding and, in the line of Rand et al. (2009), it 
suggests that what really matters is the possibility of targeted interactions, regardless if that is in 
the form of punishment or reward. Therefore, this results also question the proposal by Fehr & 
Gächter, (2000) that costly punishment is the optimal force for prompting cooperation. 
However, it is difficult to point out which incentive is overall more efficient, because while 
punishment has been more effective at incentivizing cooperation, reward has been clearly more 
effective at prompting higher payoffs. On the one hand, in the case of punishment, it is 
objectionable that the points subtracted from the punished just vanish while they could be added 
to the group payoff. On the other, it is unrealistic that the cost of reward is lower than the benefit 
that the recipient will experience —the cost is 1 and the benefit is 3. However, Szolnoki & Perk 
(2010) ascertain that this is reasonable enough because, for instance: “To praise someone hardly 
costs anything, yet it may do wonders for the recipient”. It stands to reason, that this justification 
does not suffice in the case of the financing of public goods, but still their reasoning is correct. 
Furthermore, one of the main problems of peer punishment is that individuals can punish as an act 
of revenge (Rand et al., 2009). Closely observing the data group by group, I have seen some 
situations where free riders punish cooperators, either randomly or because they have previously 
been punished by them. This harms heavily the payoff of both individuals and, even more 
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Figure 13 – Mean payoff in each variation of the PGG. 
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fearing revenge, will either stop punishing or start punishing unjustly the individuals who took 
revenge against them. In this respect, as (Rand et al., 2009) already pointed out, reward 
outperforms punishment and human cooperation in repeated settings —such as the iterated PGG— 
seems to be best supported by positive interactions. 
Regarding the cost of punishment, an interesting question to explore is why should we implement 
punishment schemes if they end up harming social welfare and they give rise to lower payoffs than 
the ones in the Standard Case scenario without incentives. It stands to reason that, from the point 
of view of maximizing welfare we should clearly reject such an investment scheme. However, 
moral values such as fairness and equality force us to implement some kind of mechanism to 
punish the ones who are benefiting from the fruits of the others —i.e. free-riding. But, in this 
respect, we should not carelessly set aside rewarding schemes.  
Regarding the use of punishment and reward, we see in Figure 14 that the latter has been more 
widely used. In many rounds the use of “Reward Points” has doubled the usage of “Deduction 
Points” and in all rounds reward’s use is well above the punishment use, except for the last round, 
where the usage of both incentives decreases and is nearly the same. Most likely, due to the finite 
horizon of the game, that makes interaction pointless in the last round because there cannot be 
effects on future cooperation. In the case of punishment, you could assign “Deduction Points” to 
a free rider, but participants beforehand know that this will not have any effect on the recipient 
behavior. This should draw back most of the participants, but by far this is not what have occurred 
in the experiment, as punishment has been used at higher percentages than nearly all rounds except 
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Punishment Reward
Figure 14 – Usage of reward and punishment. 
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In addition, we observe in period 9, in both punishment and reward, how the use of incentives 
surges, most likely to affect the behavior of others when there is still one round left and, therefore, 
there is still hope to boost cooperation. However, if participants lead themselves just for the sake 
of cooperation and to increase the social payoff, punishment in the last round should be non-
existent because participants do not have the opportunity to affect future actions of their group 
members. As a result, we must approach this surprisingly high rate of punishment in the last round 
as the result of acts of revenge or attempts to harm the payoff of other participants. For the case of 
reward, however, it is a different story. In the last round, what would have boosted the social and 
individual payoffs would have been the assignment of the highest number allowed of “Reward 
Points”, as each point creates a social welfare gain of two points. However, the usage of reward in 
the last round has been 30%, most likely because participants cared more about their individual 
payoff and therefore were afraid of assigning points without the certitude that their group members 
were about to the same thing.  
Regarding the efficiency of incentives —i.e. in our framework, the points that are added or 
subtracted for each assigned “Reward” or “Deduction Point”—, I want to highlight that it has been 
the same for both punishment and reward —equal to three. Therefore, the claim by Szolnoki & 
Perc (2010) stating that for rewards to work equally well as punishment, the ratio between the 
benefit and the cost of rewarding must be significantly higher than in case of punishment is 
challenged by the results of this experiment. Furthermore, regarding the efficiency of “Reward 
Points” I must add a final remark. Setting an efficiency of 3 points for each assigned “Reward 
Point”, I have unintentionally created an additional rational strategy. For each assigned “Reward 
Point” a social welfare gain of 2 m.u. is created, while for each point contributed to the group 
project the social gain is lower, just 1.6 m.u. For such reason, the social welfare maximizing 
strategy for this game became assigning the maximum number of “Reward Points” allowed while 
also contributing as many points available to the group project. However, looking at the results 
one by one, I have seen that just two players conducted this strategy.  
The emergence of this last strategy, has caused that the maximum payoff that could be achieved 
through the PGG with peer rewarding is much higher than in the other two variations of the game. 
The maximum group payoff that could be achieved in each round in the reward treatment was 
1040 points, while in the other variations —the standard game and the punishment treatment— 
was only 640. In Figure 15, we observe how the Standard PGG has achieved the highest 
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percentage of maximum payoff. However, it goes without saying that if we equate the denominator 
for all games, peer rewarding would have achieved the higher maximum payoff in each round, as 
it was the incentive that gave rise to the highest mean payoffs. 
 
Summarizing, the results of the experiment indicate that —at the same efficiency rate— peer 
reward can be as effective as punishment for several reasons. Although punishment has been 
clearly superior at incentivizing high levels of contribution, it entails large costs that many times 
cannot be offset by the increase in cooperation. This has been the case for this experiment, as the 
relatively higher levels of contribution that we observed in the PGG experiment with peer 
punishment could not prevent the lowest mean payoff of the three observed cases. This 
phenomenon was already pointed out on 2010 by Boyd et al. (2010), who postulated the need of 
coordinated punishment to capture the fact that the total cost of punishing a free-rider declines as 
the number of punishers increases. However, in the case of reward, participants have managed to 
achieve significantly higher payoffs with relatively low contributions. Consequently, as we do not 
want cooperation for the sake of cooperation itself but for the larger payoffs it renders, we can 
conclude that reward can be the optimal incentive scheme, not to promote cooperation itself, but 














Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10
Percentage of maximum payoff
Standard PGG PGG (peer punishment) PGG (peer rewarding)
Figure 15 – Percentage of maximum payoff in each variation of the PGG. 
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7. Conclusion 
This study provides empirical evidence that both punishment and reward succeed at sustaining 
cooperation in the PGG setting; although it is undeniable that punishment has led to higher 
contributions, I have concluded that reward can be the optimal force to trigger higher payoffs. To 
reach such concluding remarks, I have conducted my own PGG experiment in order to compare 
the outcome of the Standard Iterated PGG with two variations of the game where peer —non-
centralized— incentives were present. In the first variation, I have allowed for punishment 
opportunities and, in the second one, there were rewarding opportunities. Then, I have analyzed 
the results of each variation and I have compared them against each other. This methodology has 
been quite useful to establish several similarities and divergences between them, as well the 
strengths and downsides of each of the incentives.    
Finally, I would suggest for future research on this field the following remarks. On the one side, 
peer punishment on should be studied on a more realistic framework where the tokens subtracted 
through “Deduction Points” were added to the group project instead of just vanishing. And 
similarly, for the case of reward, I would suggest avoiding setting efficiencies above the multiplier 
factor of the public pot, otherwise we are creating another social payoff maximizing strategy where 
it is better to not contribute some tokens and put them in the rewarding stage. On the other, I would 
suggest to further study public good games when there are initial economic disparities among the 
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Annex 4: Datasets of the Stander Iterated PGG experiment. 
 




























1 2 1 1 20 20 32 44 20 24,4 24,4   
1 2 1 2     20 26,4 50,8   
1 2 1 3     12 32,4 83,2   
1 2 1 4     10 30,8 114   
1 2 1 5     8 30,8 144,8   
1 2 1 6     6 33,6 178,4   
1 2 1 7     6 25,7 204,1   
1 2 1 8     10 22,3 226,4   
1 2 1 9     2 24,9 251,3   
1 2 1 10     8 17,9 269,2   
1 2 1 11        34 1 
2 2 2 1 20 20 20 0 16 28,4 28,4   
2 2 2 2     16 30,4 58,8   
2 2 2 3     14 30,4 89,2   
2 2 2 4     12 28,8 118   
2 2 2 5     14 24,8 142,8   
2 2 2 6     8 31,6 174,4   
2 2 2 7     6 25,7 200,1   
2 2 2 8     8 24,3 224,4   
2 2 2 9     4 22,9 247,3   
2 2 2 10     3 22,9 270,2   
2 2 2 11        21 1 
3 2 3 1 20 20 32 32 20 24,4 24,4   
3 2 3 2     20 26,4 50,8   
3 2 3 3     20 24,4 75,2   
3 2 3 4     20 20,8 96   
3 2 3 5     20 18,8 114,8   
3 2 3 6     20 19,6 134,4   
3 2 3 7     20 17,5 152,9   
3 2 3 8     15 20,4 173,3   
3 2 3 9     15 19,2 192,5   
3 2 3 10     0 24,4 216,9   
3 2 3 11        56 1 
4 2 4 1 20 20 20 20 5 39,4 39,4   
4 2 4 2     10 36,4 75,8   
 48 
4 2 4 3     15 29,4 105,2   
4 2 4 4     10 30,8 136   
4 2 4 5     5 33,8 169,8   
4 2 4 6     15 24,6 194,4   
4 2 4 7     10 21,7 216,1   
4 2 4 8     5 27,3 243,4   
4 2 4 9     7 19,9 263,3   
4 2 4 10     0 25,9 289,2   
4 2 4 11        54 2 
5 1 1 1 0 0 32 24 10 36 36   
5 1 1 2     14 32,4 68,4   
5 1 1 3     15 23,8 92,2   
5 1 1 4     13 32,2 124,4   
5 1 1 5     14 28,4 152,8   
5 1 1 6     14 32 184,8   
5 1 1 7     15 15,8 200,6   
5 1 1 8     14 16,4 217   
5 1 1 9     13 27,4 244,4   
5 1 1 10     13 21 265,4   
5 1 1 11        19 2 
6 1 2 1 20 20 32 44 20 26 26   
6 1 2 2     15 31,4 57,4   
6 1 2 3     10 28,8 86,2   
6 1 2 4     10 35,2 121,4   
6 1 2 5     10 32,4 153,8   
6 1 2 6     20 26 179,8   
6 1 2 7     10 20,8 200,6   
6 1 2 8     0 30,4 231   
6 1 2 9     10 30,4 261,4   
6 1 2 10     10 24 285,4   
6 1 2 11        51 2 
7 1 3 1 0 20 32 44 15 31 31   
7 1 3 2     17 29,4 60,4   
7 1 3 3     2 36,8 97,2   
7 1 3 4     20 25,2 122,4   
7 1 3 5     12 30,4 152,8   
7 1 3 6     11 35 187,8   
7 1 3 7     0 30,8 218,6   
7 1 3 8     10 20,4 239   
7 1 3 9     8 32,4 271,4   
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7 1 3 10     12 22 293,4   
7 1 3 11        22 1 
8 1 4 1 20 0 40 32 20 26 26   
8 1 4 2     20 26,4 52,4   
8 1 4 3     20 18,8 71,2   
8 1 4 4     20 25,2 96,4   
8 1 4 5     20 22,4 118,8   
8 1 4 6     20 26 144,8   
8 1 4 7     2 28,8 173,6   
8 1 4 8     2 28,4 202   
8 1 4 9     20 20,4 222,4   
8 1 4 10     0 34 256,4   
8 1 4 11        59 1 
9 1 1 1 0 0 24 24 13 31 31   
9 1 1 2     10 34 65   
9 1 1 3     15 25,8 90,8   
9 1 1 4     8 30 120,8   
9 1 1 5     12 31,6 152,4   
9 1 1 6     2 36 188,4   
9 1 1 7     8 32,4 220,8   
9 1 1 8     13 21,8 242,6   
9 1 1 9     12 29,6 272,2   
9 1 1 10     20 22,8 295   
9 1 1 11        19 2 
10 1 2 1 0 0 32 24 10 34 34   
10 1 2 2     15 29 63   
10 1 2 3     16 24,8 87,8   
10 1 2 4     16 22 109,8   
10 1 2 5     17 26,6 136,4   
10 1 2 6     16 22 158,4   
10 1 2 7     18 22,4 180,8   
10 1 2 8     17 17,8 198,6   
10 1 2 9     10 31,6 230,2   
10 1 2 10     10 32,8 263   
10 1 2 11        19 2 
11 1 3 1 20 20 8 20 17 27 27   
11 1 3 2     15 29 56   
11 1 3 3     5 35,8 91,8   
11 1 3 4     7 31 122,8   
11 1 3 5     15 28,6 151,4   
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11 1 3 6     17 21 172,4   
11 1 3 7     17 23,4 195,8   
11 1 3 8     7 27,8 223,6   
11 1 3 9     20 21,6 245,2   
11 1 3 10     17 25,8 271   
11 1 3 11        19 2 
12 1 4 1 20 20 24 44 20 24 24   
12 1 4 2     20 24 48   
12 1 4 3     16 24,8 72,8   
12 1 4 4     14 24 96,8   
12 1 4 5     15 28,6 125,4   
12 1 4 6     10 28 153,4   
12 1 4 7     8 32,4 185,8   
12 1 4 8     0 34,8 220,6   
12 1 4 9     12 29,6 250,2   
12 1 4 10     10 32,8 283   
12 1 4 11        24 1 
13 1 1 1 20 20 0 20 7 35,4 35,4   
13 1 1 2     4 36,4 71,8   
13 1 1 3     8 29,2 101   
13 1 1 4     5 30,2 131,2   
13 1 1 5     2 30 161,2   
13 1 1 6     12 22 183,2   
13 1 1 7     1 29 212,2   
13 1 1 8     6 24,8 237   
13 1 1 9     20 16 253   
13 1 1 10     10 20,4 273,4   
13 1 1 11        18 2 
14 1 2 1 20 20 32 24 14 28,4 28,4   
14 1 2 2     14 26,4 54,8   
14 1 2 3     13 24,2 79   
14 1 2 4     13 22,2 101,2   
14 1 2 5     10 22 123,2   
14 1 2 6     10 24 147,2   
14 1 2 7     11 19 166,2   
14 1 2 8     10 20,8 187   
14 1 2 9     10 26 213   
14 1 2 10     12 18,4 231,4   
14 1 2 11        20 2 
15 1 3 1 20 20 32 44 15 27,4 27,4   
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15 1 3 2     15 25,4 52,8   
15 1 3 3     10 27,2 80   
15 1 3 4     10 25,2 105,2   
15 1 3 5     8 24 129,2   
15 1 3 6     8 26 155,2   
15 1 3 7     5 25 180,2   
15 1 3 8     5 25,8 206   
15 1 3 9     5 31 237   
15 1 3 10     0 30,4 267,4   
15 1 3 11        36 1 
16 1 4 1 20 20 32 44 20 22,4 22,4   
16 1 4 2     18 22,4 44,8   
16 1 4 3     12 25,2 70   
16 1 4 4     10 25,2 95,2   
16 1 4 5     10 22 117,2   
16 1 4 6     5 29 146,2   
16 1 4 7     8 22 168,2   
16 1 4 8     6 24,8 193   
16 1 4 9     5 31 224   
16 1 4 10     4 26,4 250,4   
16 1 4 11        21 1 
17 1 1 1 20 5 4 5 20 20 20   
17 1 1 2     5 29 49   
17 1 1 3     6 30,4 79,4   
17 1 1 4     2 26,8 106,2   
17 1 1 5     2 38,8 145   
17 1 1 6     5 33,8 178,8   
17 1 1 7     12 20,8 199,6   
17 1 1 8     15 21 220,6   
17 1 1 9     20 15,5 236,1   
17 1 1 10     10 21,2 257,3   
17 1 1 11        47 2 
18 1 2 1 20 20 20 0 10 30 30   
18 1 2 2     15 19 49   
18 1 2 3     5 31,4 80,4   
18 1 2 4     0 28,8 109,2   
18 1 2 5     20 20,8 130   
18 1 2 6     15 23,8 153,8   
18 1 2 7     5 27,8 181,6   
18 1 2 8     15 21 202,6   
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18 1 2 9     5 30,5 233,1   
18 1 2 10     10 21,2 254,3   
18 1 2 11        54 2 
19 1 3 1 20 20 32 44 10 30 30   
19 1 3 2     10 24 54   
19 1 3 3     15 21,4 75,4   
19 1 3 4     10 18,8 94,2   
19 1 3 5     10 30,8 125   
19 1 3 6     20 18,8 143,8   
19 1 3 7     10 22,8 166,6   
19 1 3 8     10 21,2 187,8   
19 1 3 9     5 24,8 212,6   
19 1 3 10     5 24 236,6   
19 1 3 11        49 2 
20 1 4 1 20 20 32 44 10 30 30   
20 1 4 2     5 29 59   
20 1 4 3     15 21,4 80,4   
20 1 4 4     10 18,8 99,2   
20 1 4 5     20 20,8 120   
20 1 4 6     7 31,8 151,8   
20 1 4 7     5 27,8 179,6   
20 1 4 8     0 36 215,6   
20 1 4 9     4 31,5 247,1   
20 1 4 10     1 30,2 277,3   
20 1 4 11        52 2 
21 1 1 1 10 4 32 0 10 28 28   
21 1 1 2     15 24,6 52,6   
21 1 1 3     13 29,8 82,4   
21 1 1 4     10 28,4 110,8   
21 1 1 5     16 24 134,8   
21 1 1 6     12 29,6 164,4   
21 1 1 7     0 32,4 196,8   
21 1 1 8     0 26,8 223,6   
21 1 1 9     0 30 253,6   
21 1 1 10     20 16 269,6   
21 1 1 11        21 1 
22 1 2 1 0 0 32 24 15 23 23   
22 1 2 2     13 26,6 49,6   
22 1 2 3     18 24,8 74,4   
22 1 2 4     10 28,4 102,8   
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22 1 2 5     8 32 134,8   
22 1 2 6     16 25,6 160,4   
22 1 2 7     5 27,4 187,8   
22 1 2 8     16 10,8 198,6   
22 1 2 9     20 10 208,6   
22 1 2 10     15 21 229,6   
22 1 2 11        22 1 
23 1 3 1 20 20 32 44 10 28 28   
23 1 3 2     10 29,6 57,6   
23 1 3 3     15 27,8 85,4   
23 1 3 4     15 23,4 108,8   
23 1 3 5     15 25 133,8   
23 1 3 6     15 26,6 160,4   
23 1 3 7     15 17,4 177,8   
23 1 3 8     0 26,8 204,6   
23 1 3 9     5 25 229,6   
23 1 3 10     5 31 260,6   
23 1 3 11        21 1 
24 1 4 1 20 6 32 24 10 28 28   
24 1 4 2     11 28,6 56,6   
24 1 4 3     11 31,8 88,4   
24 1 4 4     11 27,4 115,8   
24 1 4 5     11 29 144,8   
24 1 4 6     11 30,6 175,4   
24 1 4 7     11 21,4 196,8   
24 1 4 8     1 25,8 222,6   
24 1 4 9     0 30 252,6   
24 1 4 10     0 36 288,6   
24 1 4 11        22 1 
25 1 1 1 0 0 20 20 20 24,8 24,8   
25 1 1 2     10 30 54,8   
25 1 1 3     10 28,4 83,2   
25 1 1 4     5 31 114,2   
25 1 1 5     10 20,4 134,6   
25 1 1 6     10 31,2 165,8   
25 1 1 7     15 19,4 185,2   
25 1 1 8     10 32,4 217,6   
25 1 1 9     10 27,6 245,2   
25 1 1 10     10 28,4 273,6   
25 1 1 11        25 2 
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26 1 2 1 20 20 32 24 17 27,8 27,8   
26 1 2 2     17 23 50,8   
26 1 2 3     16 22,4 73,2   
26 1 2 4     15 21 94,2   
26 1 2 5     13 17,4 111,6   
26 1 2 6     14 27,2 138,8   
26 1 2 7     16 18,4 157,2   
26 1 2 8     15 27,4 184,6   
26 1 2 9     17 20,6 205,2   
26 1 2 10     15 23,4 228,6   
26 1 2 11        19 2 
27 1 3 1 32 32 24 44 5 39,8 39,8   
27 1 3 2     3 37 76,8   
27 1 3 3     5 33,4 110,2   
27 1 3 4     2 34 144,2   
27 1 3 5     2 28,4 172,6   
27 1 3 6     15 26,2 198,8   
27 1 3 7     2 32,4 231,2   
27 1 3 8     19 23,4 254,6   
27 1 3 9     2 35,6 290,2   
27 1 3 10     18 20,4 310,6   
27 1 3 11        25 2 
28 1 4 1 20 20 32 44 20 24,8 24,8   
28 1 4 2     20 20 44,8   
28 1 4 3     15 23,4 68,2   
28 1 4 4     18 18 86,2   
28 1 4 5     1 29,4 115,6   
28 1 4 6     14 27,2 142,8   
28 1 4 7     3 31,4 174,2   
28 1 4 8     12 30,4 204,6   
28 1 4 9     15 22,6 227,2   
28 1 4 10     3 35,4 262,6   






























(Total payoff = 
S1+S2 if Incentives) 
% of maximum 
possible payoff 
  
Period 1 399 799,4 14,25 28,55 0,8922 
Period 2 377 786,2 13,46 28,08 0,8775 
Period 3 347 768,2 12,39 27,44 0,8574 
Period 4 306 743,6 10,93 26,56 0,8299 
Period 5 320 752,0 11,43 26,86 0,8393 
Period 6 348 768,8 12,43 27,46 0,8580 
Period 7 244 691,8 8,71 24,71 0,7721 
Period 8 241 691,3 8,61 24,69 0,7715 
Period 9 276 717,6 9,86 25,63 0,8009 
Period 10 241 710,1 8,61 25,36 0,7925 
 
Understanding of Control 
Questions (% of correct answers) 
Question 1 71,4286% 
Question 2 64,2857% 
Question 3 60,7143% 
Question 4 39,2857% 
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Annex 5: Datasets of the PGG experiment with peer punishment. 
 


































































1 1 1 1 20 20 16 36 13 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 28,8 0   
1 1 1 2     15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,6 28,8   
1 1 1 3     14 0 0 0 2 2 4 12 -14 18,4 59,4   
1 1 1 4     20 0 0 2 2 4 0 0 -4 23,6 77,8   
1 1 1 5     15 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 28,8 101,4   
1 1 1 6     16 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 -4 26,8 130,2   
1 1 1 7     16 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 -4 26,8 157   
1 1 1 8     16 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 27,4 183,8   
1 1 1 9     15 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 -6 25,8 211,2   
1 1 1 
1
0     20 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 -3 27,4 237   
1 1 1 
1
1                19 2 
2 1 2 1 10 10 20 0 17 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 26,8 0   
2 1 2 2     17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,6 26,8   
2 1 2 3     17 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 -2 27,4 55,4   
2 1 2 4     17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,6 82,8   
2 1 2 5     17 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 26,8 113,4   
2 1 2 6     15 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 -6 25,8 140,2   
2 1 2 7     15 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 -6 25,8 166   
2 1 2 8     16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,4 191,8   
2 1 2 9     16 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 27,8 222,2   
 56 
2 1 2 
1
0     17 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 -15 18,4 250   
2 1 2 
1
1                19 2 
3 1 3 1 20 20   15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,8 0   
3 1 3 2     16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,6 29,8   
3 1 3 3     17 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 28,4 59,4   
3 1 3 4     16 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 -6 25,6 87,8   
3 1 3 5     19 1 1 0 1 3 0 0 -3 24,8 113,4   
3 1 3 6     18 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 -2 26,8 138,2   
3 1 3 7     19 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 -2 25,8 165   
3 1 3 8     17 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 28,4 190,8   
3 1 3 9     18 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 -2 26,8 219,2   
3 1 3 
1
0     20 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 -1 29,4 246   
3 1 3 
1
1                19 2 
4 1 4 1 20 20   17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27,8 0   
4 1 4 2     16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,6 27,8   
4 1 4 3     18 1 0 0 0 1 2 6 -7 21,4 57,4   
4 1 4 4     16 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 -6 25,6 78,8   
4 1 4 5     16 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 27,8 104,4   
4 1 4 6     18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,8 132,2   
4 1 4 7     17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,8 161   
4 1 4 8     17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,4 190,8   
4 1 4 9     18 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 27,8 220,2   
4 1 4 
1
0     19 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 -1 30,4 248   
4 1 4 
1
1                20 2 
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5 1 1 1 0 0 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 -15 17,4 0   
5 1 1 2     20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,4 17,4   
5 1 1 3     20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,8 45,8   
5 1 1 4     20 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 -3 26,6 76,6   
5 1 1 5     20 0 0 1 1 2 5 15 -17 13,4 103,2   
5 1 1 6     20 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 -2 29,2 116,6   
5 1 1 7     20 0 0 2 1 3 0 0 -3 27,8 145,8   
5 1 1 8     20 0 0 
1
0 0 10 0 0 -10 14 173,6   
5 1 1 9     20 0 0 2 1 3 10 30 -33 -2,2 187,6   
5 1 1 
1
0     20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 185,4   
5 1 1 
1
1                25 2 
6 1 2 1 20 20 10 30 16 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 -2 24,4 0   
6 1 2 2     17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,4 24,4   
6 1 2 3     20 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 -1 29,8 55,8   
6 1 2 4     20 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 -1 28,6 85,6   
6 1 2 5     20 0 0 1 1 2 2 6 -8 22,4 114,2   
6 1 2 6     20 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 -2 29,2 136,6   
6 1 2 7     20 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 -2 28,8 165,8   
6 1 2 8     20 0 0 
1
0 0 10 0 0 -10 14 194,6   
6 1 2 9     20 0 0 0 0 0 10 30 -30 0,8 208,6   
6 1 2 
1
0     20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 209,4   
6 1 2 
1
1                19 2 
7 1 3 1 20 20 20 40 15 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 -2 25,4 0   
7 1 3 2     16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32,4 25,4   
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7 1 3 3     18 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 29,8 57,8   
7 1 3 4     18 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 -4 27,6 87,6   
7 1 3 5     18 5 2 0 0 7 2 6 -13 19,4 115,2   
7 1 3 6     18 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 -12 21,2 134,6   
7 1 3 7     18 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 -12 20,8 155,8   
7 1 3 8     0 0 0 0 0 0 27 81 -81 -37 176,6   




0 0 6 26 2 6 -32 0,8 139,6   
7 1 3 
1
0     20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 140,4   
7 1 3 
1
1                25 2 
8 1 4 1 20 20 16 36 15 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 26,4 0   
8 1 4 2     18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,4 26,4   
8 1 4 3     19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,8 56,8   
8 1 4 4     16 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 -12 21,6 88,6   
8 1 4 5     18 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 -6 26,4 110,2   
8 1 4 6     20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,2 136,6   
8 1 4 7     19 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 28,8 167,8   
8 1 4 8     20 0 0 7 0 7 0 0 -7 17 196,6   
8 1 4 9     19 0 0 0 1 0 7 21 -21 10,8 213,6   
8 1 4 
1
0     20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 224,4   
8 1 4 
1
1                25 1 
9 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 1 1 3 9 8 23,8 0   
9 1 1 2     15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,8 23,8   
9 1 1 3     16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10,6 52,6   
9 1 1 4     15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 63,2   
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9 1 1 5     16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17,4 75,2   
9 1 1 6     17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,2 92,6   
9 1 1 7     16 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 12 17,4 121,8   
9 1 1 8     18 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 -1 28,6 139,2   
9 1 1 9     16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,6 167,8   
9 1 1 
1
0     16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1,6 177,4   
9 1 1 
1
1                 20 2 
10 2 2 1 20 20 10 10 20 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 -5 20,07 0,00   
10 2 2 2     15 0 3 7 7 14 1 3 -17 17,33 20,07   
10 2 2 3     17 0 0 6 6 12 2 6 -18 14,33 37,40   
10 2 2 4     15 0 3 0 5 5 3 9 -14 19,27 51,73   
10 2 2 5     18 0 0 5 5 10 1 3 -13 17,27 71,00   
10 2 2 6     18 0 0 5 7 12 1 3 -15 13,67 88,27   
10 2 2 7     18 0 0 7 5 12 1 3 -15 15,27 
101,9
3   
10 2 2 8     15 0 5 5 0 5 3 9 -14 20,33 
117,2
0   
10 2 2 9     10 0 0 6 6 12 3 9 -21 15,67 
137,5
3   
10 2 2 
1
0     10 0 0 5 5 10 1 3 -13 23,67 
153,2
0   
10 2 2 
1
1                21 2 
11 2 3 1 0 0 10 10 7 0 0 0 0 0 6 18 -18 20,07 0,00   
11 2 3 2     20 0 0 0 0 0 7 21 -21 8,33 20,07   
11 2 3 3     20 0 0 0 0 0 6 18 -18 11,33 28,40   
11 2 3 4     18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,27 39,73   
11 2 3 5     15 0 0 0 0 0 8 24 -24 9,27 70,00   
 60 
11 2 3 6     12 0 0 0 0 0 8 24 -24 10,67 79,27   
11 2 3 7     15 0 0 0 0 0 10 30 -30 3,27 89,93   
11 2 3 8     20 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 -15 14,33 93,20   
11 2 3 9     20 0 0 0 0 0 6 18 -18 8,67 
107,5
3   
11 2 3 
1
0     20 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 -15 11,67 
116,2
0   
11 2 3 
1
1                20 2 
12 2 4 1 20 20 0 20 20 3 0 1 0 4 0 0 -4 21,07 0,00   
12 2 4 2     20 0 1 0 0 1 7 21 -22 7,33 21,07   
12 2 4 3     18 0 2 0 0 2 6 18 -20 11,33 28,40   
12 2 4 4     20 0 3 0 0 3 5 15 -18 10,27 39,73   
12 2 4 5     20 0 1 3 0 4 5 15 -19 9,27 50,00   
12 2 4 6     20 0 1 3 0 4 7 21 -25 1,67 59,27   
12 2 4 7     20 0 1 3 0 4 5 15 -19 9,27 60,93   
12 2 4 8     20 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 -3 26,33 70,20   
12 2 4 9     20 0 3 0 0 3 6 18 -21 5,67 96,53   
12 2 4 
1
0     20 0 1 0 0 1 5 15 -16 10,67 
102,2
0   
12 2 4 
1
1                19 2 
13 1 1 1 20 20 10 30 13 0 
1
0 0 0 10 0 0 -10 8,2 0   
13 1 1 2     9 2 1 0 2 3 5 15 -18 11,4 8,2   
13 1 1 3     14 0 1 1 1 3 1 3 -6 14 19,6   
13 1 1 4     9 0 1 1 2 4 1 3 -7 19,6 33,6   
13 1 1 5     11 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 23,6 53,2   
13 1 1 6     7 0 1 1 1 3 6 18 -21 10,4 76,8   
13 1 1 7     8 0 0 2 0 2 6 18 -20 4,4 87,2   
 61 
13 1 1 8     10 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 -12 17,2 91,6   
13 1 1 9     9 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 -12 17 108,8   
13 1 1 
1
0     5 0 0 1 0 1 9 27 -28 7,4 125,8   
13 1 1 
1
1                20 1 
14 1 2 1 20 20 30 30 0 0 0 0 1 1 21 63 -64 -32,8 0   
14 1 2 2     20 4 0 1 1 6 1 3 -9 9,4 -32,8   
14 1 2 3     2 1 0 1 1 3 6 18 -21 11 -23,4   
14 1 2 4     7 1 0 0 1 2 3 9 -11 17,6 -12,4   
14 1 2 5     11 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 23,6 5,2   
14 1 2 6     10 1 0 1 0 2 2 6 -8 20,4 28,8   
14 1 2 7     10 2 0 2 1 5 2 6 -11 11,4 49,2   
14 1 2 8     15 2 0 1 1 4 3 9 -13 11,2 60,6   
14 1 2 9     12 1 0 0 0 1 2 6 -7 19 71,8   
14 1 2 
1
0     12 2 0 1 1 4 3 9 -13 15,4 90,8   
14 1 2 
1
1                22 2 
15 1 3 1 20 20 10 30 10 0 5 0 1 6 0 0 -6 15,2 0   
15 1 3 2     10 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 -4 24,4 15,2   
15 1 3 3     10 0 2 0 0 2 2 6 -8 16 39,6   
15 1 3 4     14 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 -4 17,6 55,6   
15 1 3 5     12 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 22,6 73,2   
15 1 3 6     15 3 0 0 0 3 3 9 -12 11,4 95,8   
15 1 3 7     1 2 1 0 0 3 8 24 -27 4,4 107,2   
15 1 3 8     12 1 1 0 1 3 2 6 -9 18,2 111,6   
15 1 3 9     13 1 0 0 0 1 3 9 -10 15 129,8   
 62 
15 1 3 
1
0     20 3 0 0 0 3 6 18 -21 -0,6 144,8   
15 1 3 
1
1                21 1 
16 1 4 1 20 20 10 30 5 0 6 0 0 6 2 6 -12 14,2 0   
16 1 4 2     7 1 0 0 0 1 4 12 -13 18,4 14,2   
16 1 4 3     9 0 3 0 0 3 2 6 -9 16 32,6   
16 1 4 4     9 0 1 0 0 1 3 9 -10 16,6 48,6   
16 1 4 5     10 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 -3 24,6 65,2   
16 1 4 6     14 2 1 1 0 4 1 3 -7 17,4 89,8   
16 1 4 7     12 2 1 4 0 7 1 3 -10 10,4 107,2   
16 1 4 8     11 1 2 1 0 4 2 6 -10 18,2 117,6   
16 1 4 9     11 2 2 3 0 7 0 0 -7 20 135,8   
16 1 4 
1
0     14 4 3 4 0 11 1 3 -14 12,4 155,8   
16 1 4 
1
1                22 2 
17 1 1 1 32 32 16 16 15 0 1 2 0 3 1 3 -6 23,8 0   
17 1 1 2     15 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 -3 28,8 23,8   
17 1 1 3     16 0 1 2 1 4 5 15 -19 10,6 52,6   
17 1 1 4     15 0 1 1 1 3 6 18 -21 12 63,2   
17 1 1 5     16 0 1 1 1 3 4 12 -15 17,4 75,2   
17 1 1 6     17 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 -3 29,2 92,6   
17 1 1 7     16 0 1 1 1 3 4 12 -15 17,4 121,8   
17 1 1 8     18 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 -3 28,6 139,2   
17 1 1 9     16 0 1 2 1 4 6 18 -22 9,6 167,8   
17 1 1 
1
0     16 0 1 2 1 4 10 30 -34 -1,6 177,4   
17 1 1 
1
1                19 2 
 63 
18 1 2 1 20 20   17 1 0 0 3 4 2 6 -10 17,8 0   
18 1 2 2     17 0 0 1 2 3 2 6 -9 20,8 17,8   
18 1 2 3     17 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 -4 24,6 38,6   
18 1 2 4     17 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 -4 27 63,2   
18 1 2 5     18 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 27,4 90,2   
18 1 2 6     17 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 -12 20,2 117,6   
18 1 2 7     18 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 -4 26,4 137,8   
18 1 2 8     19 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 27,6 164,2   
18 1 2 9     19 2 0 2 0 4 1 3 -7 21,6 191,8   
18 1 2 
1
0     20 3 0 3 0 6 1 3 -9 19,4 213,4   
18 1 2 
1
1                19 3 
19 1 3 1 20 20 16 36 10 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 -6 28,8 0   
19 1 3 2     16 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 -6 24,8 28,8   
19 1 3 3     14 0 0 0 0 0 8 24 -24 7,6 53,6   
19 1 3 4     20 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 -4 24 61,2   
19 1 3 5     18 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 -4 26,4 85,2   
19 1 3 6     20 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 26,2 111,6   
19 1 3 7     18 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 27,4 137,8   
19 1 3 8     19 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 27,6 165,2   
19 1 3 9     15 0 0 0 0 0 9 27 -27 5,6 192,8   
19 1 3 
1
0     16 0 0 0 0 0 12 36 -36 -3,6 198,4   
19 1 3 
1
1                24 1 
20 1 4 1 20 20 43 33 20 0 1 0 0 1 3 9 -10 14,8 0   
20 1 4 2     19 0 1 0 0 1 3 9 -10 17,8 14,8   
20 1 4 3     17 5 0 5 0 10 1 3 -13 15,6 32,6   
 64 
20 1 4 4     18 4 0 0 0 4 1 3 -7 23 48,2   
20 1 4 5     19 3 0 0 0 3 1 3 -6 23,4 71,2   
20 1 4 6     19 0 3 0 0 3 1 3 -6 24,2 94,6   
20 1 4 7     19 3 0 0 0 3 1 3 -6 23,4 118,8   
20 1 4 8     18 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 -3 28,6 142,2   
20 1 4 9     19 4 0 5 0 9 1 3 -12 16,6 170,8   
20 1 4 
1
0     19 7 0 7 0 14 1 3 -17 12,4 187,4   
20 1 4 
1













Mean payoff (Total payoff (S1+S2 
if Incentives) 
% of maximum 




Period 1 270 381,8 13,5 19,09 0,5966 23,50% 
Period 2 318 458,6 15,9 22,93 0,7166 16,50% 
Period 3 313 380,8 15,65 19,04 0,5950 23,50% 
Period 4 320 439 16 21,95 0,6859 17,00% 
Period 5 327 432 16,35 21,60 0,6750 19,00% 
Period 6 331 433,6 16,55 21,68 0,6775 20,50% 
Period 7 315 384,8 15,75 19,24 0,6013 24,00% 
Period 8 321 390,4 16,05 19,52 0,6100 25,50% 
Period 9 324 282,4 16,2 14,12 0,4413 36,50% 
Period 




 C. CONTROL QUESTIONS DATA 
 
 
Understanding of Control 
Questions (% of correct answers) 
Question 1a 75% 
Question 1b 75% 
Question 2a 40% 
Question 2b 35% 
Question 3a 45% 
Question 3b 35% 
Question 4 50% 


















Annex 6: Datasets of the PGG experiment with peer rewarding. 
 

























































1 1 1 20 20 16 36 20 2 0 2 2 4 5 15 11 40,6 0   
1 1 2     20 3 0 3 3 6 7 21 15 45,4 40,6   
1 1 3     20 3 0 0 3 3 11 33 30 58,8 86   
1 1 4     20 1 0 1 1 2 9 27 25 55,8 144,8   
1 1 5     20 2 0 2 1 3 11 33 30 53,6 200,6   
1 1 6     20 2 0 2 1 3 10 30 27 52,6 254,2   
1 1 7     20 2 0 2 2 4 7 21 17 44,2 306,8   
1 1 8     20 2 0 2 2 4 6 18 14 42 351   
1 1 9     15 0 0 2 2 4 7 21 17 48,8 393   
1 1 10     20 3 3 3 0 6 3 9 3 27 441,8   
1 1 11                59 1 
2 2 1 20 20 16 36 14 1 0 1 1 3 0 0 -3 32,6 0   
2 2 2     16 2 0 2 2 6 2 6 0 34,4 32,6   
2 2 3     17 1 0 0 1 2 4 12 10 41,8 67   
2 2 4     17 1 0 1 1 3 2 6 3 36,8 108,8   
2 2 5     0 5 0 5 5 15 0 0 -15 28,6 145,6   
2 2 6     5 5 0 5 5 15 0 0 -15 25,6 174,2   
2 2 7     8 2 0 2 2 6 0 0 -6 33,2 199,8   
2 2 8     10 2 0 2 2 6 0 0 -6 32 233   
2 2 9     12 3 0 3 3 9 1 3 -6 28,8 265   
2 2 10     20 0 0 0 0 0 6 18 18 42 293,8   
2 2 11                19 2 
3 3 1 20 20 16 36 20 3 0 3 3 6 3 9 3 32,6 0   
3 3 2     20 5 2 5 5 12 5 15 3 33,4 32,6   
3 3 3     15 5 4 0 5 14 0 0 -14 19,8 66   
 67 
3 3 4     20 6 2 6 6 14 4 12 -2 28,8 85,8   
3 3 5     20 6 0 6 4 10 7 21 11 34,6 114,6   
3 3 6     20 4 0 4 2 6 8 24 18 43,6 149,2   
3 3 7     20 4 0 4 4 8 5 15 7 34,2 192,8   
3 3 8     20 4 0 4 4 8 4 12 4 32 227   
3 3 9     20 2 1 5 5 8 9 27 19 45,8 259   
3 3 10     20 3 3 3 0 6 3 9 3 27 304,8   
3 3 11                51 2 
4 4 1 0 0 16 36 20 1 0 0 0 1 6 18 17 46,6 0   
4 4 2     20 0 0 0 0 0 10 30 30 60,4 46,6   
4 4 3     20 5 0 0 5 5 9 27 22 50,8 107   
4 4 4     20 2 0 2 2 4 8 24 20 50,8 157,8   
4 4 5     19 0 0 0 0 0 10 30 30 54,6 208,6   
4 4 6     19 1 0 1 3 2 8 24 22 48,6 263,2   
4 4 7     20 1 0 1 0 2 8 24 22 49,2 311,8   
4 4 8     20 0 0 0 0 0 8 24 24 52 361   
4 4 9     20 2 0 4 4 6 10 30 24 50,8 413   
4 4 10     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 463,8   
4 4 11                22 1 
5 1 1 0 0 16 16 10 0 0 0 0 0 14 42 42 68,4 0   
5 1 2     1 
1
0 1 0 1 2 3 9 7 40 68,4   
5 1 3     1 
1
0 0 0 1 1 1 3 2 27 108,4   
5 1 4     3 
1
0 1 0 1 2 5 15 13 48,8 135,4   
5 1 5     10 
1
0 0 0 3 3 9 27 24 48,4 184,2   
5 1 6     13 
1
0 0 0 3 3 12 36 33 52,4 232,6   
 68 
5 1 7     0 
1
0 0 0 0 0 6 18 18 51,6 285   
5 1 8     1 
1
0 6 2 4 12 7 21 9 45,2 336,6   
5 1 9     15 
1
0 0 0 6 6 15 45 39 63,2 381,8   
5 1 10     0 
1
0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 47 445   
5 1 11                21 1 
6 2 1 0 0 16 16 10 5 5 6 5 16 7 21 5 31,4 0   
6 2 2     20 0 5 1 2 3 7 21 18 32 31,4   
6 2 3     1 0 0 1 3 4 2 6 2 27 63,4   
6 2 4     18 0 9 7 8 15 9 27 12 32,8 90,4   
6 2 5     7 5 4 3 7 15 2 6 -9 18,4 123,2   
6 2 6     0 6 0 1 8 15 3 9 -6 26,4 141,6   
6 2 7     19 0 
1
0 0 8 8 10 30 22 36,6 168   
6 2 8     20 0 
1
0 3 8 11 17 51 40 57,2 204,6   
6 2 9     8 8 4 5 
1
0 23 6 18 -5 26,2 261,8   






0 20 4 12 -8 16 288   
6 2 11                22 1 
7 3 1 11 0 16 16 11 7 5 
1
0 3 15 8 24 9 34,4 0   
7 3 2     4 3 2 1 0 5 2 6 1 31 34,4   
7 3 3     3 1 2 3 4 7 2 6 -1 22 65,4   
7 3 4     11 5 5 5 5 15 9 27 12 39,8 87,4   
7 3 5     4 2 2 2 2 6 3 9 3 33,4 127,2   
7 3 6     3 4 3 0 7 14 1 3 -11 18,4 160,6   
 69 
7 3 7     0 6 6 1 1 13 0 0 -13 20,6 179   
7 3 8     7 7 8 
1
0 2 17 5 15 -2 28,2 199,6   
7 3 9     5 5 5 5 5 15 5 15 0 34,2 227,8   
7 3 10     20 1 1 1 1 3 13 39 36 60 262   
7 3 11                22 1 
8 4 1 20 20 10 30 10 2 2 2 2 6 8 24 18 44,4 0   
8 4 2     10 0 4 1 2 5 3 9 4 28 44,4   
8 4 3     10 0 0 1 3 1 8 24 23 39 72,4   
8 4 4     15 0 3 2 3 5 14 42 37 60,8 111,4   
8 4 5     15 2 0 0 3 2 12 36 34 53,4 172,2   
8 4 6     15 2 0 0 3 2 18 54 52 69,4 225,6   
8 4 7     15 0 4 0 1 4 9 27 23 41,6 295   
8 4 8     15 0 3 0 2 3 14 42 39 61,2 336,6   
8 4 9     20 2 1 0 4 3 21 63 60 79,2 397,8   
8 4 10     20 0 3 3 3 6 11 33 27 51 477   
8 4 11                21 1 
9 1 1 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 1 1 3 9 8 30,4 0   
9 1 2     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,2 30,4   
9 1 3     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,4 61,6   
9 1 4     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,6 90   
9 1 5     7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25,8 121,6   
9 1 6     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,2 147,4   
9 1 7     17 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 12 30,2 178,6   
9 1 8     6 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 -1 23,8 208,8   
9 1 9     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32,8 232,6   
9 1 10     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32,8 265,4   
9 1 11                20 1 
10 2 1 20 2 0 0 6 1 2 1 2 4 0 0 -4 22,4 0   
10 2 2     9 0 3 3 4 7 2 6 -1 21,2 22,4   
10 2 3     3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25,4 43,6   
 70 
10 2 4     8 0 1 1 0 1 2 6 5 28,6 69   
10 2 5     5 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 -2 25,8 97,6   
10 2 6     6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25,2 123,4   
10 2 7     10 0 1 1 0 1 3 9 8 33,2 148,6   
10 2 8     2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28,8 181,8   
10 2 9     12 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 12 32,8 210,6   
10 2 10     5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27,8 243,4   
10 2 11                22 2 
11 3 1 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 1 2 1 3 1 28,4 0   
11 3 2     9 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 15 37,2 28,4   
11 3 3     8 0 0 0 3 3 1 3 0 20,4 65,6   
11 3 4     11 0 0 0 1 1 4 12 11 31,6 86   
11 3 5     10 0 0 0 1 1 3 9 8 30,8 117,6   
11 3 6     12 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 5 24,2 148,4   
11 3 7     11 0 2 0 0 2 2 6 4 28,2 172,6   
11 3 8     9 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 5 26,8 200,8   
11 3 9     10 0 1 0 0 1 2 6 5 27,8 227,6   
11 3 10     12 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 9 29,8 255,4   
11 3 11                22 2 
12 4 1 0 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 1 1 4 12 11 33,4 0   
12 4 2     10 0 2 2 0 4 4 12 8 29,2 33,4   
12 4 3     10 0 0 1 0 1 3 9 8 26,4 62,6   
12 4 4     10 0 2 3 0 5 1 3 -2 19,6 89   
12 4 5     10 0 0 2 0 2 2 6 4 26,8 108,6   
12 4 6     10 0 0 2 0 2 1 3 1 22,2 135,4   
12 4 7     0 4 1 1 0 6 0 0 -6 29,2 157,6   
12 4 8     10 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 2 22,8 186,8   
12 4 9     10 0 3 2 0 5 0 0 -5 17,8 209,6   
12 4 10     15 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 -3 14,8 227,4   
12 4 11                21 1 
13 1 1 20 20 64 36 5 3 2 4 7 13 0 0 -13 24 0   
 71 
13 1 2     5 2 3 0 0 3 0 0 -3 26,4 24   
13 1 3     15 2 0 0 3 3 6 18 15 39,6 50,4   
13 1 4     10 0 0 5 3 8 1 3 -5 26,2 90   
13 1 5     12 3 0 5 4 9 3 9 0 29,2 116,2   
13 1 6     10 2 0 3 4 7 0 0 -7 23,8 145,4   
13 1 7     5 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 -3 32,8 169,2   
13 1 8     7 2 3 4 4 11 0 0 -11 20 202   
13 1 9     17 0 2 3 5 10 4 12 2 29,4 222   
13 1 10     5 0 2 3 4 9 0 0 -9 25,2 251,4   
13 1 11                54 2 
14 2 1 20 20 16 16 20 0 1 2 2 4 6 18 14 36 0   
14 2 2     1 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 9 42,4 36   
14 2 3     10 2 1 1 2 5 1 3 -2 27,6 78,4   
14 2 4     10 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 34,2 106   
14 2 5     5 1 0 1 1 3 0 0 -3 33,2 140,2   
14 2 6     10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,8 173,4   
14 2 7     10 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 2 32,8 204,2   
14 2 8     10 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 9 37 237   
14 2 9     10 0 0 1 0 1 2 6 5 39,4 274   
14 2 10     12 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 9 36,2 313,4   
14 2 11                56 1 
15 3 1 20 20 16 36 15 0 2 0 0 2 6 18 16 43 0   
15 3 2     18 0 0 0 1 1 5 15 14 30,4 43   
15 3 3     10 2 0 0 1 3 1 3 0 29,6 73,4   
15 3 4     18 0 0 0 2 2 7 21 19 42,2 103   
15 3 5     20 2 0 0 4 6 9 27 21 42,2 145,2   
15 3 6     16 0 0 0 2 2 5 15 13 37,8 187,4   
15 3 7     20 0 0 0 3 3 5 15 12 32,8 225,2   
15 3 8     14 0 0 0 2 2 5 15 13 37 258   
15 3 9     20 3 0 0 1 4 7 21 17 41,4 295   
15 3 10     16 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 15 38,2 336,4   
 72 
15 3 11                21 1 
16 4 1 20 20   15 0 2 0 0 2 9 27 25 52 0   
16 4 2     12 0 0 5 0 5 1 3 -2 20,4 52   
16 4 3     14 2 1 0 0 3 6 18 15 40,6 72,4   
16 4 4     15 1 1 2 0 4 5 15 11 37,2 113   
16 4 5     16 0 0 3 0 3 9 27 24 49,2 150,2   
16 4 6     16 0 0 2 0 2 6 18 16 40,8 199,4   
16 4 7     17 0 0 3 0 3 4 12 9 32,8 240,2   
16 4 8     14 0 0 1 0 1 6 18 17 41 273   
16 4 9     14 1 0 3 0 4 6 18 14 44,4 314   
16 4 10     15 0 1 2 0 3 4 12 9 33,2 358,4   
16 4 11                19 3 
17 1 1 0 0 16 36 9 0 5 3 4 12 1 3 -9 24,4 0   
17 1 2     15 2 3 3 1 7 3 9 2 30,2 24,4   
17 1 3     20 0 0 0 0 0 15 45 45 53 54,6   
17 1 4     16 0 0 0 5 5 6 18 13 32,2 107,6   
17 1 5     10 0 1 0 3 4 3 9 5 39 139,8   
17 1 6     15 0 0 5 6 11 6 18 7 35,2 178,8   
17 1 7     20 0 2 3 5 10 9 27 17 43,8 214   
17 1 8     13 0 0 1 5 6 8 24 18 42,6 257,8   
17 1 9     18 0 1 2 3 6 1 3 -3 29,8 300,4   
17 1 10     15 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 9 29,6 330,2   
17 1 11                20 2 
18 2 1 20 20 16 36 20 0 0 0 0 0 9 27 27 49,4 0   
18 2 2     10 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 12 45,2 49,4   
18 2 3     0 
1
0 0 0 0 10 0 0 -10 18 94,6   
18 2 4     1 1 0 0 1 2 1 3 1 35,2 112,6   
18 2 5     19 1 3 1 3 5 5 15 10 35 147,8   
18 2 6     8 2 1 2 3 7 1 3 -4 31,2 182,8   
18 2 7     20 3 3 0 3 6 8 24 18 44,8 214   
 73 
18 2 8     0 2 1 2 3 7 1 3 -4 33,6 258,8   




0 0 10 2 6 -4 26,8 292,4   
18 2 10     15 2 2 1 0 3 1 3 0 20,6 319,2   
18 2 11                22 1 
19 3 1 20 20 16 36 7 1 1 1 1 3 3 9 6 41,4 0   
19 3 2     13 1 1 2 1 3 3 9 6 36,2 41,4   
19 3 3     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 77,6   
19 3 4     6 1 1 0 1 3 0 0 -3 26,2 105,6   
19 3 5     11 1 1 0 1 3 2 6 3 36 131,8   
19 3 6     15 1 1 0 1 3 10 30 27 55,2 167,8   
19 3 7     7 1 1 0 1 3 3 9 6 45,8 223   
19 3 8     11 1 1 0 1 3 3 9 6 32,6 268,8   
19 3 9     20 1 1 0 1 3 12 36 33 63,8 301,4   
19 3 10     9 1 1 0 1 3 1 3 0 26,6 365,2   
19 3 11                24 1 
20 4 1 20 20 16 36 20 0 3 0 3 3 5 15 12 34,4 0   
20 4 2     20 2 0 0 6 2 2 6 4 27,2 34,4   
20 4 3     0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 -5 23 61,6   
20 4 4     15 4 0 0 0 4 7 21 17 37,2 84,6   
20 4 5     20 1 3 1 6 5 7 21 16 40 121,8   
20 4 6     20 3 0 3 1 6 10 30 24 47,2 161,8   
20 4 7     20 5 5 0 
1
0 10 9 27 17 43,8 209   
20 4 8     20 5 0 0 0 5 9 27 22 39,6 252,8   
20 4 9     19 0 0 0 0 0 4 12 12 43,8 292,4   
20 4 10     0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 38,6 336,2   













Mean payoff (Total payoff 
(S1+S2 if Incentives) 
% of maximum 
possible payoff  %Reward Use 
Period 1 257 750,2 12,85 37,51 0,7213 49,00% 
Period 2 233 681,8 11,65 34,09 0,6556 35,50% 
Period 3 177 646,2 8,85 32,31 0,6213 35,00% 
Period 4 244 736,4 12,2 36,82 0,7081 47,50% 
Period 5 240 738 12 36,90 0,7096 48,50% 
Period 6 233 741,8 11,65 37,09 0,7133 50,50% 
Period 7 259 741,4 12,95 37,07 0,7129 46,50% 
Period 8 229 735,4 11,45 36,77 0,7071 49,50% 
Period 9 285 807 14,25 40,35 0,7760 59,00% 








Understanding of Control Questions 
(% of correct answers) 
Question 1a 65% 
Question 1b 60% 
Question 2a 65% 
Question 2b 50% 
Question 3a 45% 
Question 3b 35% 
Question 4 90% 
Question 5 90% 
